We estimate accelerator-cash flow models for 25,000 firms in 15 transition economies over the period [1993][1994][1995][1996][1997][1998][1999][2000][2001][2002][2003], and find that (1) investment-cash flow sensitivities decline over transition years, which we attribute to a decreasing of asymmetric information and managerial discretion as capital markets and corporate governance standards develop. (2) After an ownership change, the investment-cash flow sensitivity declines, indicating that new owners reduce either cash constraints or managerial discretion or both. (3) For state owned firms, in early transition the investment-cash-flow sensitivity is negative, but in late transition the coefficient becomes positive. We interpret the first fact as being consistent with soft budget constraints, and the second with managerial discretion. (4) Privatised firms invest efficiently in the long run. (5) Foreign firms are less financially constrained than other firms.
I. Introduction
In transition economies, the efficient re-allocation of capital is crucial for the success of reforms. However, empirical studies on investment behaviour in the early transition reveal puzzling results. Some authors claim that "larger firms had virtually unlimited access to capital". 1 Other authors show that "firms which made losses were not liquidity constrained and were still able to draw upon external funds". 2 In a similar vein, a study on Russia reveals a negative relationship between internally generated cash flows and investment in members of financial-industrial groups.
3
The observed investment patterns in the early transition, such as overinvestment by stateowned loss-makers, underinvestment by state-owned profit-makers, asset-stripping, and internal reallocation of funds in firms affiliated to business groups, challenge traditional investment theories.
In developed countries, the rationale for a low investment-cash flow sensitivity is that firms have proper access to external sources of finance due to their high reputational capital, low asymmetric information with external providers of capital, and low managerial discretion. In early postcommunist transition, however, the rationale for the link between internally generated cash flows and investment can be found out in the peculiar institutional environment, namely: (1) the underdevelopment of the financial sector and its failure to provide an efficient allocation of funds leading to severe asymmetric information problems (soft budget constraint as a system specific problem), (2) the motivation of the state to bail out the state-owned banks providing soft loans (soft budget constraint due to paternalistic motives).
Soft budget constraint (SBC) was first observed by Janos Kornai in the Hungarian economy of the 1970s, a socialist economy experimenting with the introduction of market reforms. He explained SBC as one of the system-specific attributes of any socialist economy. "The budget constraint on a state-owned enterprise under the socialist system is soft, whereas the budget constraint on a private firm under the capitalist system is hard" (Kornai, 2000) . At the beginning of the 1990s, the dominant state sector and financial centralisation made the high degree of the SBC inevitable.
Studies explaining SBC have focused on the political considerations, such as the desire of a "paternalistic" government to avoid socially costly layoffs or unemployment (see e.g. Kornai, 1980) . Paternalism can be also seen to motivate the owners to bail out enterprises affiliated to large corporate organisations consisting of many units (e.g. Japanese keiretzu, Korean jaebol) in both developed and developing countries (see e.g. for India Majumdar, 1998) . Thus, SBC has also firmspecific manifestations that can be found in any economic environment.
There are studies documenting hardening the budget constraint over transition years (Kornai, 2001) . However, most papers on corporate investment behaviour in transition countries focused on the early transition period. 4 . A common approach for examining the impact of ownership on investment is to apply a rather narrow typology of owner identities classifying firms into three groups: state-owned, private, and foreign-owned. 5 Few studies focus on broader corporate governance determinants of investment, and no study addresses the effects of ownership changes on investment in transition countries. 6 In this paper, we empirically investigate four major questions. Which are the changes of investment patterns over transition years (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) ? Is there evidence of a hardening of the budget constraint of state-owned firms over this period? Which are the effects of privatisation on the investment-cash flow sensitivity over transition years? How do different ownership categories (foreigners, financial institutions, and privatisation funds) determine investment behaviour?
The paper studies institutional determinants of investment performance of both listed and non-listed firms in 15 transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) over the period [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] . In particular, we estimate investment-cash flow models using the accelerator model of investment and augmenting it with cash flow terms. Investment-cash flow sensitivity proxies for (1) company financial constraints, since asymmetric information between the firm and external capital markets hampers the optimal investment or (2) financial slack, since corporate governance fails in some firms and growth-seeking managers use internal funds to invest beyond the optimal level.
Our study contributes to the literature of corporate governance and investment in transition economies: (i) presenting firm-level evidence for the major patterns of ownership transformation in 4 E.g. see the cited above Lizal and Svejner (2002) and Budina, Garretsen and de Long (2000) ; Konings, Rizov and Vandenbussche (2002) for firms in Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Romania during 1994-99. Some studies examine late transition, e.g. see Mueller and Peev (2007) for 151 public firms in ten transition economies during 1999-2003. 5 Among recent contributions see e.g. for Hungary, Colombo and Stanca (2006) for 4333 firms over the period 1989 -1999 and Perotti and Vesnaver (2004 for 56 public companies in the period from 1992 to 1998. Among the early studies, see e.g. Grosfeld and Nivet (1997) for 173 large firms in Poland during [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] . The authors distinguished three types of enterprises: state-owned, "commercialised", and privatised. 6 Perotti and Gelfer (2001) examine the controlling role of banks in financial-industrial groups in Russia. They study 71 public companies in 1995 and find a negative correlation between investment and cash flow in bank-led groups. The authors explain this result with extensive reallocation of funds and use of profitable firms as cash cows. Durnev and Kim (2003) study firm-level governance and transparency data on 859 firms in 27 countries (incl. five transition economies: China, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Russia). They find that in countries that are less investor friendly, firms adapt to the poor legal environment by establishing efficient governance practices themselves.
fifteen CEE countries over a ten years' period; (ii) suggesting hypotheses for the asymmetric information and managerial discretion consequences of ownership changes; (iii) examining the effects of ownership changes on company investment. Section 2 discusses the various hypotheses and the econometric modelling. Section 3 presents the data and sample characteristics. Section 4 analyses the econometric results. Section 5 scrutinizes the soft budget/asset stripping phenomenon by discussing state-controlled firms in more detail. Section 6 draws policy implications.
II. Hypotheses and Econometric Modeling
In the neoclassical model of investment, the neoclassical cost of capital and firm investment opportunities are the only determinants of investment. The usual criticism of the neoclassical approach is based on the overwhelming empirical evidence that internal cash flows co-determine investment. Many studies find a positive link between internally generated cash flows and company capital investment. 7 Two theories have been put forward to explain investment dependence on corporate liquidity, e.g. the asymmetric information theory (AIT) Myers and Majluf, 1984; Fazzari et al., 1988 for the first empirical test) and the managerial discretion theory (MDT, Grabowski and Mueller, 1972) . 8 Both treat current cash flow as a proxy for the internal availability of funds. The asymmetric information theory assumes firms cannot reach their optimal investment level due to financial constraints (i.e. firms under-invest), while the managerial discretion theory predicts that firms reinvest too much of their internal funds and pay out too little in dividends (i.e.
firms over-invest). 9 We also assume that the better availability of internal cash flow is a proxy for lower financial constraints or lower perceived cost of capital for managers in transition economies under the assumption of a hard budget constraint.
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7 For a survey of empirical studies, see Chirinko, 1993; Mueller, 2003, p.177-79, and Gugler (2005) . The literature on investment-cash flow regressions was criticized for a number of reasons, most notably by Zingales (1997, 2000) on the grounds that cash flow merely proxies for future investment opportunities, and thus a positive investmentcash flow coefficient does not say anything about cash constraints. This paper addresses this ambiguity in the interpretation of investment-cash flow coefficients by utilizing information on the ownership structure of the firm. For example, one cannot argue that a positive coefficient for a state-controlled firm proxies for their better investment opportunities. Thus finding cash flow induced investment of a state-controlled firm is indicative of managerial discretion. 8 For recent studies applying both AIT and MDT, see Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu, 2004a. 9 Various proxies of financial constraints are used, like dividends payments (Fazzari et al. 1988) ; firm affiliation to business groups (Hoshi et al, 1991) ; age, ownership concentration, and membership in an interrelated group (Chirinko and Schaller, 1995) . 10 According to (Kornai et al, 2003) , the difference between a hard and soft budget constraint is as follows. A firm has a budget constraint: it must cover its expenditures out of its initial endowment and revenue. If it fails to do so, deficit arises. The firm faces hard budget constraint as long as it does not receive support from other organizations to cover its deficit.
However, the post-communist transitional process has two specific dimensions challenging the assumption of a hard budget constraint: business environment of a soft budget constraint in the early transition years and a process of hardening the budget constraint over transition. First, in the early transition, a soft budget constraint of state-owned firms was a common practice. Loss-makers had access to soft loans due to the support from the state-banks, "crony" political connections, severe asymmetric information, and a high managerial discretion. Potentially profitable state-owned firms were ruined by both the state tax authorities and their managers. Kornai et al. (2003) postulates that the main question is not why we observe soft budget constraints in socialist economies, but rather why the soft budget constraint is not more prevalent in capitalist economies.
In the latter, government can credibly commit not to refinance enterprises due to institutional conditions like well functioning markets for liquidated assets, competition across enterprises, decentralization of credit, and the like.
Second, transition process can be seen as hardening the budget constraint (Kornai, 2001 ).
This transformation has several features.
(1) The first step was the introduction of the legislation for imposing financial discipline, e.g. bankruptcy laws and commercial laws to ensure that private contracts can be enforced, the development of the court system to ensure the efficient law enforcement, and the like. (2) Privatisation and the dominance of the private sector is a necessary condition for hardening the budget constraint, but not a sufficient one (Kornai, 2001) . The crucial point is about the motivation of the new private owners to have fewer links with the state and fewer expectations of state assistance. (3) The tight macroeconomic policy (e.g. tight monetary and fiscal policy, introduction of currency board, and the like) were a necessary, but not sufficient condition for hardening the budget constraint. Restructuring of state-owned firms in order to ensure profitability was the other key factor. (4) Finally, the move from a centralised to a decentralised credit system is seen as a way how the budget constraint can be hardened (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995) . For example, Hungary was a successful story with fast decentralisation and privatisation of the banking sector to foreign investors in 1994-1995. In contrast, the financial crisis in Bulgaria in 1996-1997 was due to the delay of bank privatisation and establishment of "crony" links among the state-owned banks, government, and firms. Among all these factors, the development of the
The soft budget constraint occurs if one or more supporting organizations (e.g. government, banks) are ready to cover all or part of the deficit.
financial sector plays a crucial role for supply of funds to investment activities of non-financial firms. The practical considerations for this approach are the availability of ownership information. 12 There are few empirical studies on post-communist transition addressing ownership changeability issues.
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Potential motives behind ownership changes could be the inefficient investment behaviour by old owners. The old owners could be either cash constrained and not be able to finance all profitable investment opportunities, or they may be bad entrepreneurs either over-investing or engaging in asset stripping. New owners like a multinational firm could finance all profitable projects by own internal funds or good access to external capital markets, or they shape up corporate governance and invest optimally. In any case, the estimated cash flow sensitivity should decrease after ownership change. Thus, we obtain:
Hypothesis 2. The investment-cash flow sensitivity decreases after a change in ownership.
The typical change of property-rights of socialistic state-owned enterprises in the early transition was the so-called "corporatisation" or their transformation into companies with a hundred percent state participation (Peev, 1995) . This was a transitory stage after the withdrawal of the state from firm affairs and before the firm's privatisation. Managers of state-owned commercialised firms had a high degree of managerial discretion. On the other hand, state-owned firms had soft budget constraints (easy access to external funds provided by government, state-owned banks and other institutions, (Kornai, 2001) . The soft budget constraint implies distorted investment behaviour in three major dimensions. First, overinvestment by loss-makers having access to soft loans by state-owned banks, the latter bailed out by the government. Second, underinvestment by potential profit-makers due to financial re-allocation by the government to support loss-makers. Third, asset-11 See . 12 For evidence that ownership concentration is stable over a few years, see also Köke (2001) for the case of Germany in 1993-97; Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) for Canada in 1986-91, or Morck et al. (1988) for the US. 13 See e.g. Jones and Mygind (1999) for ownership change in Estonia; Grosfeld and Hashi (2003) for the Czech Republic and Poland; for Bulgaria.
stripping (decapitalisation) of assets. In all the cases, internally generated cash flows are either not relevant for investment decisions or we may expect a negative relation between investment and cash flow. We expect these problems to be particularly severe in early transition. The progress of institutional and financial reform may however lead to a hardening of budget constraints even for state-owned firms. The conventional managerial discretion may then lead to a positive investmentcash flow sensitivity. We test:
Hypothesis 3. State-owned firms display zero or negative investment-cash flow coefficients in early transition years, while in late transition this relation becomes positive.
The common view is that privatisation should harden the budget constraint. Boycko et al (1996) present a model in which privatisation effectively drives a wedge between managers and politicians. In this model, privatisation leads to "depolitization" and makes too costly for politicians to subsidise the firms. Thus we test:
Hypothesis 4. After privatisation, there is no relation between investment and internally generated funds.
The long-run company survival depends on access to investable funds and innovation. In transition countries, a common view is that firms controlled by foreign investors have easier access to external finance and Western markets. We thus expect less severe asymmetric information problems in firms under foreign control compared to domestic firms. Financial owners may also mitigate the asymmetric information problems between managers and external capital markets.
However, both foreign and financial owners themselves may suffer from agency problems. We remain open the question about their managerial discretion problems and make no predictions about its change (Table 2 ). This research follows the conventional approach applied in most previous studies and tests the "strong" form of the view on the role of foreign investors and financial institutions on investment decisions.
Hypothesis 5. Firms controlled by foreign investors have a weaker relation between
investment and internally generated funds than firms controlled by domestic investors.
Hypothesis 6. Firms controlled by financial institutions have a weaker relation between investment and internally generated funds than firms controlled by non-financial owners.
Finally, firms controlled by privatization funds have ownership structures similar to corporate pyramids. Pyramid ownership structures consist of a chain of owners with an ultimate owner who has control over a firm through a controlling stake on each level. The literature reveals that the typical agency issues include expropriation of small shareholders through income shifting (Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung, 2000) , tunnelling (Johnson et al., 2000) , and large shareholder entrenchment. Thus, in firms controlled by privatisation funds we expect high managerial discretion, since ultimate control is diffuse and many privatization funds have still preserved their close ties to the state increasing potential agency problems. On the other hand, studies show that corporate pyramids are involved in redistribution activities among affiliated firms substituting the inefficient external capital markets. We remain open the question about the asymmetric information problems in firms controlled by privatisation funds (Table 2 ). Assuming the conventional view that these firms suffer from severe agency problems, we test:
Hypothesis 7. Firms controlled by privatization funds display a stronger relation between investment and internally generated funds than other firms.
Investment models usually differ in how they: (i) variables." (Mueller, 2003, p. 179-180) .
We test the hypotheses presented above by estimating a simple investment accelerator-cash flow model, linking cash flow (a proxy for liquidity), sales growth (a proxy for investment opportunities) and ownership structures to investment. All of the independent variables are lagged one period to avoid their being partly endogenous. Financial variables are scaled by the firm's capital stock to eliminate size effects. The basic equation may be written as:
where I is investment in property, plant and equipment measured by the change in the capital stock (proxied by tangible fixed assets -item 3, Amadeus data base, Formula of accounts and ratios) plus deprecation (item 42). K is the book value of capital stock measured by tangible fixed assets. CF is cash flow measured by net profit after tax (item 39) plus deprecation (item 42), S is average total annual sales (item 25). By estimating (1) for different sub-samples of firms we can test the hypotheses discussed above. We test the change in the impact of cash flow on investment over time by including an interaction term of cash flow and one over time. 
III. Data and Sample Characteristics
The main databases that we will use are the 1997-2005 versions of Amadeus. This is a PanEuropean financial database, containing balance sheet and ownership structure information on over 250,000 major public and private companies in all sectors in more than 30 European countries. To be included in Amadeus companies must comply with at least one of the following criteria: (i) their turnover must be greater than 10 million EURO; (ii) the number of their employees must be greater than 150; and (iii) their total assets must be greater than 10 million EURO. firm displays an investment to capital stock ratio of 31.5% (1.9%), and cash flow to capital stock ratios of about 56.6% (14.2%). While the average firm grows at a 72% rate (sales), median firm sales actually stay constant or even shrink slightly over the sample period. All this implies that there are some firms that are particularly successful to invest, earn cash flows and grow, however that the median firm is not. Moreover, there is a lot of variation across countries with the lowest median investment rate in Romania (-14%) and the largest in Hungary (21%).
14 See Mueller (1986) for a similar approach. This estimator eliminates firm effects by first-differencing as well as controls for possible endogeneity of current explanatory variables. Endogenous variables lagged two or more periods will be valid instruments provided that there is no second-order autocorrelation in the firstdifferenced idiosyncratic error terms. The Sargan tests do not suggest rejection of the overidentifying restrictions at conventional levels for either control category. While there is evidence of first order serial correlation in the residuals, the AR(2) test statistics reveal absence of second order serial correlation in the first differenced errors and thus that the instruments are valid.
Panel B of

IV. Empirical Evidence on Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity
The models perform satisfactorily with the sales accelerator and the cash flow terms taking on the expected values and being highly significant. The year dummies on the early years indicate negative conditional investment rates compared to 2003 (the constant can be interpreted as the conditional investment rate for 2003). The R² is 11% in the pooled OLS regression, which is satisfactory for a regression with 12 explanatory variables and more than 90,000 observations.
Moreover, the inclusion of more than 25,000 firm dummies -while increasing the R² to 48% and the adjusted R² to 27% -does not change the main results on the cash flow terms. Likewise, the main results carry over from OLS or fixed effects to GMM estimation. The coefficient on CF/K is 0.097 (t = 12.40) for the whole pooled sample declining to around 0.07 (t = 6.48) with firm fixed effects and to 0.05 (z = 9.65) for the GMM estimates.
As already mentioned, asymmetric information ( 18 This is the pattern we expect if (1) cash flow is predominantly a proxy for the internal availability of liquidity and (2) asymmetric information problems vanish over time in CEE countries. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is corroborated for our sample of CEE countries.
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Hypotheses 2-4 focus on the effects of ownership transformation on investment-cash flow sensitivities. We identify firms that had the same largest owner type in the first and last year of our data set and term this sub-sample "stable", and compare it with firms changing the type of their largest owner and term them "non-stable" (Table 6 ). We apply the same procedure for ownership change from state to other owners through privatisation (Table 7) . Table 7 compares stable state ownership firms with privatised firms, where we restrict the privatized firm sample to those firms that were "really" privatized and not merely put into the ownership of a privatisation fund. The transformation appears to be much harsher for privatized firms than for those firms that stayed under state control, since all year dummies indicate larger drops in investment rates over time. Firms that remained under state control display a highly negative investment-cash flow sensitivity in the period until 1998, and they eventually settle at a sensitivity of 0.34 (t = 2.35). With GMM, we even get the result that state-controlled firms display a negative cash flow influence over the whole period pointing to soft budget constraints problems.
Thus, hypothesis 3 is partly corroborated. State-owned firms presumably enjoy soft budget constraints in the early years of transition and suffer from the classical managerial discretion problem thereafter. We present further discussion in section 5. Privatized firms, on the other hand, appear to invest efficiently, corroborating hypothesis 4. Their cash flow coefficients are insignificant in all specifications pointing to a low cash flow-investment sensitivity. Table 8 presents the results of testing Hypotheses 5-7 on the effects of ownership identities.
Hypothesis 5 states that foreign controlling owners should alleviate cash constraints compared to domestic controlling owners. This is confirmed by the empirical evidence (Panel A of Table 8 firms decreases at a very rapid pace over time (the coefficient on the 1/time*CF term is 0.57 with GMM), the investment of domestically controlled firms is projected to remain cash flow induced (at 0.07). GMM estimates for foreign controlled firms show a negative relationship between cash flow and investment. For the purposes of this study, we may speculate that the observed reallocation of funds among firms -subsidiaries of foreign parents -might be partly explained by the presence of capital market imperfections in transition countries and access to finance from other units of the multinational network. 21 We leave this result for further research.
Hypothesis 6 assumes that financial controlling owners should alleviate cash constraints vis a vis non-financial owners. This hypothesis is not corroborated (Panel B, Table 8 ). The cash flow coefficient is 0.1 for OLS estimates (0.15 for GMM, respectively) and significant for financiallycontrolled firms. It appears that domestic banks are not able to play the role yet which foreign owners (banks or firms) can play for their controlled firms.
Finally, hypothesis 7 states that firms controlled by privatisation funds invest more cash flow induced not because these firms were cash constrained, but due to managerial discretion. The right part of Panel B in Table 8 reports a positive OLS cash flow coefficient (0.11, t = 1.78). With GMM, however, we estimate a negative cash flow effect. Thus, for firms controlled by privatization funds cash flow coefficients are changing signs pointing to possible endogeneity problems of OLS estimates. The negative cash flow coefficient could be partly explained by financial redistribution among firms affiliated to privatisation funds.
V. Soft Budget Constraint of State-Controlled Firms
Hypothesis 3, state-owned firms enjoy soft budget constraints in the early years of transition, was corroborated, but the observed negative investment-cash flow coefficients require further analysis to identify the types of inefficient investment behaviour. We may separate a negative investment-cash flow coefficient due to (1) high investment in loss-making firms (overinvestment) based on soft loans from state-owned or "crony" banks, (2) low investment in profit-making firms (underinvestment) and (3) de-capitalisation (asset-stripping), when the investment rate is negative. samples of loss-making and profit-making firms. The asset-stripping is typical for 1996, the first year in this sample. While we are sure that it was also typical before 1996, we have not sufficient data for the early transition years. The sub-sample of loss-making state-owned firms show striking characteristics consistent with soft budget constraints. The loss-makers are firms with (i) slightly higher than average investment rate, (ii) very low internally generated cash flows, (iii) bad investment opportunities measured by the growth of sales, and (iv) On the other hand, a pattern of underinvestment is observed for state profit-makers, which are less indebted. The coefficient on CF/K is positive in the early period and settles at essentially zero as time elapses. Thus, for our sample of state-owned firms over the period 1996-2003, we identify overinvestment of loss-makers as the major factor explaining the negative investment-cash flow sensitivity. The access to soft loans and the consequent high indebtedness of these firms is a specific form of the soft budget constraint over the studied period.
VI. Conclusions
We may outline several policy conclusions of our study presenting empirical evidence on the investment-cash flow sensitivities in CEE countries over the period 1993 estimates show that this sensitivity declines over time: asymmetric information and/or managerial discretion problems were more severe in the early years of transition and their effects were decreasing over transition. We conjecture that the external capital markets and corporate governance institutions have been gradually developing in CEE countries.
Second, we find significant differences in the investment-cash flow sensitivity when ownership of the largest shareholder and therefore control changes. Generally, the sensitivity declines after a control change consistent with lower AI and/or MD problems of new owners.
Third, systematic differences arise when the state preserves its control on firms during transition years. In early transition there was a negative investment-cash flow sensitivity for stateowned firms, which we explain by soft budget constraints and/or asset-stripping. The major type of the inefficient investment behaviour was overinvestment of highly indebted state loss-makers.
Fourth, we also find empirical support for the efficient effects of privatisation on company investment decisions. Privatized firms do not display a significantly negative investment-cash flow sensitivity anymore after privatization.
Finally, we present empirical evidence that the identities of owners do matter. Foreigncontrolled firms display a smaller investment-cash flow sensitivity than domestically-controlled firms. Thus, the results support the view that foreign owners mitigate asymmetric information problems between external capital markets and company managers. However, the expectations for the role of financial owners were not corroborated. It appears that domestic banks are not able to play the role yet which foreign owners (banks or firms) can play for their controlled firms. Our estimates also show that firms under stable control of privatization funds over the period [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] display financial redistribution activities. We leave for further research the questions about the efficiency of this redistribution as well as the financial redistribution activities of subsidiaries of foreign owners. Note. We estimate equation (1). Fixed effects is firm fixed effects. GMM is one-step GMM. "Sargan test" is the p-value of a Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions; AR(k) is the p-value of a test that the average autocovariance in residuals of order k is zero. I is investment in property, plant and equipment measured by the change in the capital stock (proxied by tangible fixed assets -item 3, Amadeus data base, Formula of accounts and ratios) plus deprecation (item 42). K is the book value of capital stock measured by tangible fixed assets. CF is cash flow measured by net profit after tax (item 39) plus deprecation (item 42), S is average total annual sales (item 25). We define time as taking on the value of one in 1995, two in 1996 and so on until a value of time of 9 in 2003. We estimate equation (1). Fixed effects is firm fixed effects. GMM is one-step GMM. "Sargan test" is the pvalue of a Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions; AR(k) is the p-value of a test that the average autocovariance in residuals of order k is zero. I is investment in property, plant and equipment measured by the change in the capital stock (proxied by tangible fixed assets -item 3, Amadeus data base, Formula of accounts and ratios) plus deprecation (item 42). K is the book value of capital stock measured by tangible fixed assets. CF is cash flow measured by net profit after tax (item 39) plus deprecation (item 42), S is average total annual sales (item 25). We define time as taking on the value of one in 1995, two in 1996 and so on until a value of time of 9 in 2003. Note. Financial: the largest shareholder is financial investor; Privatization fund: the largest shareholder is a privatization fund. * From regression excluding 1/time*CF t-1 /K t-1. We estimate equation (1). Fixed effects is firm fixed effects. GMM is one-step GMM. "Sargan test" is the pvalue of a Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions; AR(k) is the p-value of a test that the average autocovariance in residuals of order k is zero. I is investment in property, plant and equipment measured by the change in the capital stock (proxied by tangible fixed assets -item 3, Amadeus data base, Formula of accounts and ratios) plus deprecation (item 42). K is the book value of capital stock measured by tangible fixed assets. CF is cash flow measured by net profit after tax (item 39) plus deprecation (item 42), S is average total annual sales (item 25). We define time as taking on the value of one in 1995, two in 1996 and so on until a value of time of 9 in 2003. Note: (Not) Highly indebted Debt/TA ratio larger (smaller) than median (0.13) Note. We estimate equation (1). I is investment in property, plant and equipment measured by the change in the capital stock (proxied by tangible fixed assets -item 3, Amadeus data base, Formula of accounts and ratios) plus deprecation (item 42). K is the book value of capital stock measured by tangible fixed assets. CF is cash flow measured by net profit after tax (item 39) plus deprecation (item 42), S is average total annual sales (item 25). We define time as taking on the value of one in 1995, two in 1996 and so on until a value of time of 9 in 2003.
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